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Abstract  
Energy markets are an important contemporary site of economic globalization. In this paper we use a global 
production network (GPN) approach to examine the evolutionary dynamics of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
sector and its role in an emerging global market for natural gas. We extend recent work in the relational 
economic geography literature on the organizational practices by which production networks are assembled 
and sustained over time and space; and we address a significantly underdeveloped aspect of GPN research by 
demonstrating the implications of these practices for the territoriality of global production networks. The 
paper introduces LNG as a techno-material reconfiguration of natural gas that enables it to be moved and sold 
beyond the continental limits of pipelines. We briefly outline the evolving scale and geographical scope of 
LNG trade, and introduce the network of firms, extra-economic actors and intermediaries through which LNG 
production, distribution and marketing are coordinated. Our analysis shows how LNG is evolving from a 
relatively simple ‘floating pipeline’ model of point-to-point, bi-national flows orchestrated by producing and 
consuming companies and governed by long-term contracts, to a more geographical and organizationally 
complex production network that is constitutive of an emergent global gas market. Empirically the paper 
provides the first systematic analysis within economic geography of the globalization of the LNG sector and 
its influence on global gas markets, demonstrating the potential of GPN (and related frameworks) to 
contribute meaningful analysis of the contemporary political economy of energy.  Conceptually the paper 
pushes research on GPN to realize more fully its potential as an analysis of network territoriality: by 
examining how the spatial configuration of global production networks emerges from the organizational 
structures and coordinating strategies of firms, extra-economic actors and intermediaries; and by recognizing 
how network territoriality is constitutive of markets rather than merely responsive to them.  
KEYWORDS: Global Production Networks, Territoriality, Network Practices, Liquefied Natural Gas  
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Introduction 
 
Spatially dispersed production networks are widely acknowledged as a significant organizational form within 
the global economy. The territorial configuration of global production networks and value chains, however, 
remains an under-developed analytical theme in the economic geography literature. As a consequence, the 
relationship between network territoriality and practices of network co-ordination is not well understood. A 
better understanding of the territoriality of production networks, and how territoriality emerges from the 
coordinating strategies of firms, extra-economic actors and intermediaries, is necessary if economic 
geography is to provide richer analyses of their geo-economic/geo-political consequences and the mutually 
constitutive character of spatial and organizational form. In this paper we use a global production network 
(GPN) approach to examine the evolutionary dynamics of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply chain and its 
role in an emerging global market for natural gas.  
Energy markets are an important contemporary site of political-economic change, shaped by a combination of 
economic policy goals (e.g. market liberalization and supply competition), geopolitical and geo-economic 
shifts in power (with associated concerns about energy security) and environmental objectives (e.g. climate 
change mitigation and urban air quality). An earlier generation of geographical researchers recognized the 
significance of energy markets and the importance of understanding their structural and dynamic features in 
accounting for the geographies of economic activity. Manners (1964), for example, placed market demand at 
the center his survey of ‘The Geography of Energy’ and its influence on economic development; the eight 
editions of Odell’s (1970, 1986) classic ‘Oil and World Power’ highlighted the role of oil markets in shaping 
geopolitical relations during one of the most turbulent periods in the sector’s history; and Chapman’s (1989) 
‘Geography and Energy: commercial systems and national policies’ examined the organizational and spatial 
structure of electricity, oil and gas markets. However, despite the enduring importance of energy markets, it is 
only recently that they have again become a focus of attention within geography (for a recent review see 
Calvert 2016).  International markets for natural gas are currently undergoing profound change. Gas 
consumption worldwide has grown 25% in the last decade, with projections of a ‘Golden Age of Gas’ buoyed 
by surging shale gas production in the US, large conventional gas discoveries (e.g. offshore East Africa, 
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eastern Mediterranean and Australia), and fuel switching in power and urban transport sectors. In many 
national contexts the shift towards gas has been facilitated by energy market deregulation, major 
infrastructural investment (e.g. in pipelines and import terminals), and environmental regulation that valorizes 
the lower particulate and greenhouse gas emissions of gas relative to coal or oil (IEA 2011, 2014). However, 
the most significant process transforming international gas markets – and the focus of this paper – is the 
increasing integration of geographically discrete gas markets and, for the first time, the prospect of global gas 
market emerging similar to that for oil. Central to this process has been a growing sea-borne natural gas trade, 
in the form of LNG, which increasingly enables gas to be moved and sold beyond the continental limits of 
pipelines. As we show, however, growth in LNG trade is accompanied by a deeper process of integration 
associated with cross-border production networks for making, selling and transporting liquefied natural gas— 
what is commonly referred to as the ‘LNG supply chain’. These global production networks for LNG stretch 
from upstream gas extraction to downstream gas consumption via intermediate processes of gas processing, 
liquefaction, shipping and regasification. We show how the territorial form of these production networks is 
evolving, along with the organizational practices through which they are held together, and how the manner of 
their evolution is bringing a global gas market into being.   
The contributions of the paper, therefore, are three-fold. It provides the first systematic analysis within 
economic geography of the globalization of the LNG sector and its influence on global gas markets. In doing 
so, it demonstrates the potential of GPN to contribute meaningful analysis of the contemporary political 
economy of energy. Second, it critically extends recent work in the relational economic geography literature 
on the organizational practices by which production networks are assembled and sustained over time and 
space. We agree with Murphy (2012: 211) that GPN/GVC research has yet to develop fully an “empirically 
informed exposition of how different production network configurations develop through the actions of 
agents” and we see value in his call for a “process-sensitive approach” attuned to the “process(es) through 
which network linkages are established, sustained, and reorganized over time and space” (Murphy 2012: 211). 
The paper responds to this call, examining how LNG production networks are scaled and sustained by 
focusing on the practices that hold together different network actors. Third, by foregrounding the concept of 
territoriality we address an under-realized potential of the GPN approach for examining the implications of 
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network practices for the territorial configuration of global production networks. We concur with Coe and 
Yeung (2015: 35) that to date “the territoriality of global production networks is elusive and under-
developed.” By paying attention to the spatial configuration of LNG production networks we are able to show 
how, in the case of natural gas, global production networks are constitutive of markets—market making—
rather than merely responsive to them.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section Two contextualizes the paper’s conceptual 
and empirical contributions via a review of recent work in GPN. In Section Three we provide a brief 
introduction to the LNG sector and outline our methods and approach. Section Four presents our analysis of 
geographical and organizational change in LNG production networks. We identify three organizational trends 
re-shaping the spatial configuration of LNG production networks, and show how they are eroding the 
dominance of a long-established business model in LNG (what we refer to as the ‘floating pipeline’). We 
examine contract terms and other “network development practices” (Murphy 2012) associated with these 
organizational changes, and explain how they introduce significant sources of geographical flexibility and 
uncertainty into the LNG production network. Section Five concludes by considering the wider implications 
of the paper’s analysis of organizational and geographical shifts in LNG production networks.  
 
Unfinished Business: Extending Territoriality, Materiality and Network 
Practices within GPN Research  
Contemporary social science has a rich set of heuristics for understanding the political economy of 
globalization and, in particular, for examining how spatially-distributed economic activity is functionally 
coordinated. Some derive from studies of international trade and take the commodity as their analytical unit; 
others emerge from industry studies and focus on issues of value-chain management, innovation, and sectoral 
governance; still others highlight the dialectical interplay of territorial and network coherence, and allow for a 
broad range of ‘economic’ actors beyond the firm. As readers of this journal will know well, economic 
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geographers have played a significant role in developing a broad family of relational approaches for 
understanding the interconnectedness, organization and co-ordination of industrial sectors that includes work 
on global commodity chains (GCC, e.g. Hughes and Reimer 2004), global value chains (GVC, e.g. Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005) and global production networks (Coe 2012: 390). The GPN approach is the most spatially-
sensitive member of this family with its embrace of multiple geographical scales, recognition of a plurality of 
economic actors extending beyond the firm, and attentiveness to the unevenness of regional development 
outcomes. A GPN approach focuses on the relationship between the geographical extensification of economic 
activities and their organizational integration and co-ordination. It was initially developed as a tool for 
understanding changes in the geographical organization of manufacturing and services at the world scale, and 
examining the implications for regional development of the internationalization of economic activity 
(Henderson et al. 2002, Coe et al. 2004, Dicken 2015). Consistent with its materialist origins, the GPN 
approach seeks to understand how existing interactions - around price formation or product design, for 
example - are outcomes of the distribution of power within a production network; and, furthermore, how these 
interactions are generative of new organizational and geographical forms. Production networks, then, are 
understood as “organisational platforms through which actors in different regional and national economies 
compete and co-operate for a greater share of value creation, transformation, and capture though 
geographically dispersed economic activity” (Yeung and Coe 2015: 30). The point here is not simply that 
production networks are dynamic over space and time, but that network spatio-temporality is an emergent 
property and arises from interactions among a network’s constituent parts.  
 
The GPN approach’s capacity for understanding the mutually constitutive character of spatial configuration 
and network organization make it well suited to analyzing economic sectors whose organizational and 
geographical structures are in a state of flux. So far, the center of gravity of the GPN research framework has 
been manufacturing, where it has been adopted to understand functional and geographic integration in a range 
of sectors from aircraft (Bowen 2007) and automobiles (Isaksen and Kalsaas 2009) to textiles (Tokatli et al. 
2008) and wood products (Murphy 2012, Gibson and Warren 2016). However, recent work has taken GPN 
into less familiar terrain, to examine producer services such as temporary staffing (Coe et al. 2011), freight 
forwarding (Bowen and Leinbach 2006, Rodrigue 2006), the creative sector (Yoon and Malecki 2010, Johns 
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2006), and extractive industries (Bridge 2008, Bridge and Le Billon 2013, Steen and Underthun 2011, 
MacKinnon 2013). These studies have expanded the sectoral reach of GPN research but have also highlighted 
some its conceptual limits and opportunities for further development.  We are drawn to GPN’s spatially-
sensitive relational approach and its advantage in this regard over GCC and GVC approaches: we think GPN’s 
geographical sensitivity has the capacity to generate novel insights about the evolution of the LNG sector that 
make an original contribution to energy studies. However, we also think GPN’s potential as a distinctively 
geographic mode of analysis is under-developed and can be enhanced by attending to three conceptual 
elements: GPN’s account of territoriality; understanding of materiality and material transformation; and 
interest in network practices.  The case of LNG foregrounds these limitations, while at the same time 
suggesting how attending to them can advance research utilizing GPN and other relational approaches.  
 
Territoriality 
 
The spatial re-ordering of manufacturing at the global scale provided the initial impetus for early work on 
‘global shift’ and the exercise of ‘global reach’ in fragmented economic networks (Dicken 1986). However, 
explicit attention to the spatial configuration of networks has more recently taken a backseat in GPN research 
in preference for more parsimonious modes of explanation and theory-building in relation to network 
organization and processes of strategic coupling between leading global firms and local actors (e.g. Lee et al. 
2014, Mahutga 2014). We think the concept of territoriality is an underdeveloped conceptual resource for 
more closely examining the territorial configuration of networks and the value activities of which they are 
comprised. In general terms, territoriality describes “the process by which individual and collective social 
actors define, bind, reify and control space toward some social end” (Steinberg 1994: 3). The concept draws 
attention to the way in which particular geographies (i.e. a specific territorial configuration, combining 
elements of both geographical reach and interaction with place) are integral to the exercise of economic and 
political power (Brenner et al. 2003). Territoriality initially piqued interest within political geography, as a 
way of thinking about the practices that produce and maintain territory (see, for example, Taylor 1994, Paasi 
1998). Its capacities for de-naturalising spatial form, and for linking spatial form with strategic practice, 
subsequently encouraged its application within a wider range of political-economic accounts. The potential for 
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economic geography of theorizing “the territoriality behind territory” was noted early on by Steinberg (1994: 
5) in the context of the ‘new industrial geography,’ although it was not directly taken up. The concept’s 
capacity for hinging spatial form with political-economic power was enough to give territoriality a fleeting 
role within the first generation of GPN research (e.g. Hess 2004). Yet it remained a marginal term within GPN 
1.0, overshadowed by GPN 1.0’s conceptual trinity of power, embeddedness and value.   
 
Coe and Yeung (2015: 69) have recently highlighted territoriality’s analytical potential as part of a GPN 2.0. 
For them, territoriality comprises vertical and horizontal dimensions of production networks: the former refers 
to the ‘spatial scope’ or geographic reach of different economic actors (on a scalar continuum from global to 
local) within a production network; and the latter refers to the ‘territorial interfaces’ among value activities 
that have different spatial expressions (for example, some may be highly localized, and others expressed as 
regional clusters). Schematic and provisional, we nonetheless find this framework a useful starting point as it 
re-centers the question of spatial configuration within GPN research. It has long been acknowledged within 
GPN research that global production networks are spatially fragmented and ‘discontinuously territorial’, but 
the problem of ‘global shift’ – i.e. how the territorial configuration of production networks evolves in relation 
to the generation and capture of value – has not been a core research focus in recent years. The analytical 
value of territoriality in this task, we suggest, is that it both foregrounds the particularity of a network’s 
territorial configuration (why this spatial form, why now?), and links this form to strategic intent (for what 
ends, with what effects?). It is, then, more than a fancy synonym for describing a network’s complex spatial 
form as we retain the processual and evolutionary understanding associated with its initial application – i.e. 
territoriality points to the practices undertaken by network actors to establish, maintain and adapt a production 
network’s territorial form.    
  
As we will show, the LNG production network is rapidly evolving: its organizational structures are 
diversifying and the ‘spatial rules’ that have characterized LNG production and consumption for nearly fifty 
years are changing in ways that are economically and geopolitically significant (cf. Glassman 2011). 
Importantly, these organizational, territorial and geopolitical dimensions are not captured by conventional 
analyses that understand the geographies of LNG through the lens of bi-national trade flows. Conventional 
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analyses readily show LNG consumption to be growing, and the number of producing and consuming 
countries and firms to be increasing, but say very little about how the ‘global shift’ underway in LNG (and gas 
markets more generally) arises from significant organizational changes in LNG production networks. The 
concept of territoriality provides a way to think about the evolving spatial configuration of LNG production 
networks, its relationship with the relative power of different network actors, and geographical and 
geopolitical consequences.  
 
Materiality 
 
A significant strand of recent work in economic geography has called for greater attention to the material 
transformations at the heart of global production networks and commodity chains. Building on calls to better 
understand the “influence materiality exerts on industrial organization” (Bridge 2008: 415, Boyd et al. 2001, 
Prudham 2005, Hudson 2008), this work explores the significance of materials, and biological, chemical and 
mechanical processes, within global value chains. The central provocation of these accounts is that the 
heterogeneity of materials and the variability of biophysical processes enables and shapes a production 
network’s spatial and organizational form in ways that are economically significant, yet under-appreciated. A 
logical starting point for investigating how materials matter has been ‘nature-facing’ primary sectors, such as 
forestry, fisheries, mining and agriculture, that are strongly characterized by seasonality, biological 
reproduction times, and geological and ecological variability. Ciccantell and Smith (2009) argue that material 
and locational attributes of the primary sector influence production networks in distinctive ways: they 
highlight, for example, how large and ‘lumpy’ capital investments are frequently required to mobilize raw 
materials via ports and pipelines, and the dynamic interaction of scale economies in raw material production 
and transportation (see also Bunker and Ciccantell 2005). Gibson and Warren’s (2016) description of a 
“resource-sensitive GPN” shows how shortages of traditional hardwoods (which have prized qualities of 
resonance, strength and beauty) and environmental regulation influence the organization and spatiality of 
acoustic guitar manufacturing, leading to both fragmentation and concentration within the production chain. 
In a similar way, Crang et al.’s (2013) research on economies of waste highlights the profound heterogeneity 
of materials encountered in waste flows, and how the corresponding need for fine-grained sorting gives 
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intermediary brokers (rather than large lead firms) a key role within waste value chains because of their 
capacity for assessing material quality.   
 
The primary insight of these different studies is to problematize accounts of production, exchange and 
consumption by emphasizing how production networks are organized around moments of material 
transformation, in which the (biological, chemical, physical) qualities of materials shape strategies for value 
capture. To call attention to materiality in this context, then, is to emphasize the ‘political-economic 
possibilities’ and limitations of material qualities, and their influence upon the organizational and spatial 
structures of energy regimes (Birch and Calvert 2015). In the case of LNG, for example, production networks 
are structured around the flow of gas from the upstream well-head to the downstream consumer as part of an 
overall value creation process.1 At the core of the production network are material exchanges and 
transformations associated with extracting, processing, liquefying, shipping, regasifying, distributing and 
consuming gas (Figure 1). Representing the production network as a series of physical input-output structures 
enables consideration of how infrastructural assets and the technological division of labor associated with 
long-distance gas supply are territorially embedded. Figure 1 illustrates how gas extraction and liquefaction 
stages, for example, are shaped by the developmental aspirations of the host state (Territory 1), for whom gas 
extraction and LNG export are typically part of a strategy of resource-based development. Similarly, 
downstream elements are strongly influenced by the differential ways in which gas is embedded in municipal 
and national energy markets (Territory 2), via electricity generation, for example. We are aware that others 
have found this stage-based model of production limiting because it may overlook differences among firms 
within individual stages, as well as how some actors may be involved in several stages in different ways (Coe 
and Yeung 2015: 38). However, a stage-based model of the gas production chain based around key moments 
of material transformation is well-suited to analysis of LNG production networks. Historically the LNG 
production chain has conformed to a simple organizational model in which ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ 
stages have been internalized within the organizational structures of two different firms (Firms A and B in 
Figure 1). By starting with a stage-based model we are able to show how, following processes of vertical and 
horizontal integration by lead firms, the organizational structures of the production network no longer map 
straightforwardly onto an underlying technical division of labor between upstream extraction and processing 
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and downstream distribution and consumption. Moreover, we are able to show how these organizational shifts 
are, simultaneously, introducing significant new territorial forms to LNG production networks.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE – Conceptualizing the LNG Production Network] 
 
Network practices 
GPN research has a comparatively granular approach to the organization of economic activity, focusing on the 
“intra-firm, inter-firm and extra-firm networks that characterize contemporary production systems” (Hess and 
Coe 2006: 1207). The capacities of GPN’s relational network perspective are well known for situating 
economic actors in social and institutional context, emphasizing the significance of their interaction, and 
understanding the contingency of economic processes (Bathelt and Glückler 2003). However, the 
organizational practices that link buyers and sellers, align their interests, and reproduce these relations over 
time and space – i.e. which constitute relational networks as networks (as opposed to intra-firm hierarchies, 
for example) - require further elaboration. In the context of GPN research, for example, Murphy (2012) has 
highlighted a need for greater attention to the ways in which network agents establish, maintain and adapt 
network linkages. In his work on the international Bolivian wood products industry, Murphy identifies a range 
of ways in which actors develop ties to international markets. He draws attention to the different strategies 
that Bolivian supplies adopt in aligning their interests with international buyers and clients, highlighting the 
importance of these “network development practices” to enhancing relational proximity and creating network 
structures.  
 
We take up Murphy’s call for greater attention to the socio-economic process that hold production networks 
together and maintain spatially distributed elements as a functional whole. We agree that grounded 
“empirically informed exposition(s) of how different production network configurations develop through the 
actions of agents” can shed light on the processes behind emergent spatial forms (Murphy 2012: 210). 
Focusing on practices of interaction and co-ordination complements the processual and evolutionary 
understanding of territoriality outlined above, in that it makes it possible to understand the production network 
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as a set of competing agendas and asymmetric power relations through which the territorial configuration of a 
production network takes shape. Paying attention to devices through which practices are negotiated and 
prescribed, such as contract terms, enables an assessment of how spatial ties are created and modified over 
time. Accordingly, the concept of ‘network development practices’ (Figure 1) provides a way to focus our 
analysis on key interactions between sellers and buyers that sustain the LNG production network, and which 
are important in understanding its changing organizational structures and geographical form.  
 
Researching LNG: an introduction to the sector and our research methods  
 
In comparison to oil, natural gas consumption remains strikingly localized: nearly three quarters of the natural 
gas consumed worldwide (70.5% in 2015, see Figure 2) is consumed in the country where it was produced, in 
comparison to the 64.4% of global oil production that is exported (BP 2016). However, the proportion of 
natural gas traded internationally has been increasing year on year. A growing proportion (32.4% in 2015) of 
the just over 1 trillion cubic meters of gas traded internationally each year does so as liquefied natural gas 
(LNG, Figure 2). Unbound by the fixed infrastructure of pipelines, LNG introduces much greater 
geographical flexibility to international gas trade and offers, for the first time, the prospect of a global gas 
market analogous to that for oil. An increasing supply of flexible and relatively inexpensive LNG is 
anticipated to be one of the most significant developments in the global energy system in the remainder of this 
decade (IEA 2016).2 The growth of international trade and cross-border investment in LNG is, then, part of a 
larger process of deepening globalization underway within international energy markets such that national 
systems of energy provision are increasingly porous (Bridge and Bradshaw 2015, Overland 2016).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE – World Production and Exports of Natural Gas and LNG, 2015]  
 
At the core of the LNG production network is a process of capital-intensive material transformation that 
upgrades the value of gas per unit volume. Liquefaction is achieved by cooling natural gas to below its boiling 
point (-163°C), increasing its energy density 600-fold (to about 65% that of crude oil) and substantially 
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improving the economics of gas transportation beyond the limits of the pipeline network (i.e. by road tanker 
or by ship). Liquefaction is an example of a broad suite of technological interventions that seek to overcome 
“diseconomies of space” (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005), effectively creating a commodity by transforming 
materials from one physical state to another. Its effect is to mobilize and globalize natural gas in 
unprecedented ways. Ocean-borne LNG enables gas producers to monetize historically ‘stranded’ gas reserves 
and access large markets ‘beyond the pipeline’; it creates opportunities for arbitrage between regional 
markets; and enables utilities and other gas users to diversify sources of supply. By mobilizing gas beyond the 
continental limits of pipelines, the growth of LNG trade is disrupting established practices among buyers and 
sellers along the gas ‘supply chain’ and driving new patterns of uneven development at the regional and 
global scale.3 While LNG’s growing significance can be interpreted as the inexorable evolution of a 
commodity market (Pirrong 2014), such accounts leave much unexplained. Where, when, and how (in a 
contractual sense) LNG moves worldwide depends on how a diverse group of economic agents - including 
international oil companies, state-owned oil and gas producers, sovereign governments, municipal utilities, 
shipping companies, and gas traders – are sustained in relation with one another. Understanding the structures 
and practices that create and maintain global production networks for LNG is essential, therefore, if we are to 
assess how LNG will reshape existing geographies of gas and its implications for energy security, the low 
carbon energy transition and other areas of policy concern. For gas importing states, for example, LNG can 
provide a way to offset physical and price risks associated with pipeline gas and other fuels:  in a European 
context the possibility of LNG imports from North America is seen as means of reducing reliance upon 
Russian pipeline gas imports and adding greater competition (Bordoff and Houser 2014, Coote 2016, 
European Commission 2016).  The case of LNG, then, readily captures how global production networks are 
influenced by geopolitical considerations (cf. Glassman 2011).  
 
Analysis of the geopolitical economy of LNG has been limited to date. There is a good quality trade literature 
(e.g. GIIGNL 2015, IGU 2015) and several high-quality assessments conducted by consultancies, 
international agencies, and independent research centers (Jensen 2004, Pöyry 2010, Standard Chartered 2011, 
Stern 2012, Rogers 2015, Ledesma et al. 2014, IEA 2014, and Corbeau and Ledesma 2016). However, such 
work tends to either focus on trade flows between states (reflecting a methodological nationalism common to 
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work on international commodity trade), or provides empirically rich assessments of key trends that eschew 
conceptualization or theoretical development. At the same time, industry research tends to be uncritical in the 
sense that it seeks to ‘talk up’ the future prospects for the industry, and often specific regions and projects, to 
reassure current and potential investors in the supply chain. Within economic geography there is growing 
interest in understanding the geographical political economies of natural gas (e.g., Zalik 2011, Fry 2013, Steen 
and Underthun 2011, Andrews and McCarthy 2014, Bradshaw et al. 2015, Bouzarovski et al. 2015). To date, 
however, there has been no systematic effort to analyze the structures and dynamics of the LNG sector and 
their territorial consequences. Studies that have applied GPN to the natural gas sector have used it to describe 
existing networks within a region rather than analyze their dynamic evolution: Leung (2014) adopts the 
framework to evaluate the role of gas in China’s energy transition and characterize its organizational forms, 
and Stephenson and Agnew (2016) deploy a GPN framework to describe hydrocarbon production in the 
Russian Arctic.  
 
The analysis in this paper is informed by a two-year period of research focused on understanding the changing 
position of the UK within global gas markets associated with declining domestic gas production (from the 
North Sea) and growing dependency on imported gas since 2004. The LNG component of this research 
examined the organizational structures through which LNG arrives in the UK; the impact that significant 
changes in international gas markets had on LNG flows; and the role of organizational structures and co-
ordination strategies in modifying these impacts in terms of the volume and timing of LNG imports.4 The 
project brought together economic geographers, other social scientists, and energy analysts with specialist gas 
industry expertise. It involved desk-based research using secondary sources (including annual corporate and 
sector overviews), sustained interactions with industry specialists and senior level corporate representatives 
(via bespoke research meetings, participation in international industry conferences, and the integration of gas 
analysts as project partners), site visits to Qatar Petroleum’s facilities at Ras Laffan and the UK’s LNG import 
terminals, and interviews (in the UK, US and Qatar) with firms active in the UK and other gas markets. In 
structure and purpose, both research meetings and interviews adhered to a model of ‘close dialogue’ with 
industry practitioners as a means of deriving knowledge and “mak(ing) sense of economic diversity in relation 
to broader…processes of economic change” (Clark 1998: 74). Interviews followed an open-ended and semi-
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structured approach, and were designed to develop an understanding of industry structures and observed 
practices associated with investment in the LNG production network. Since gas contracts are proprietary and 
their terms are rarely disclosed as a matter of public record, corporate interviews and frequent discussions 
with industry specialists were an essential element of the research, and enabled understanding to be built up 
through conversational exchange and iteration, as well as via more formal modes like triangulation. These 
methods underpin the paper’s analysis of the interconnected agents, processes and structures through which 
LNG is produced and distributed.  
 
From LNG trade to production networks  
 
In this section we briefly review the evolution of the global LNG sector and highlight significant changes in 
its territorial form since 2000. We then explain in the following section how cross-border investment in 
network infrastructure and changing contract terms are enabling a global market for LNG to emerge. Early 
commercial uses of liquefaction were in local gas markets as a way to store gas in order to meet peaks in 
demand – a process known as ‘peak shaving’. The application of LNG to address spatial (rather than 
temporal) discontinuities in supply developed initially in the 1950s, although large-scale commercial 
shipments of LNG began with the commissioning of exports from Algeria to the UK and France in 1964. The 
early Mediterranean/Atlantic focus of LNG trade was supplemented in the 1970s by deliveries from Alaska, 
Brunei, Indonesia and Abu Dhabi (and later, Malaysia and Australia) into the Japanese market. From the mid-
70s onwards Japan and the intra-Pacific Basin trade came to dominate LNG flows (over 70% in the early 
1980s), and most new export capacity developed in this period was associated with Japan’s diversification 
away from oil (Vivoda 2014). The complexity of the global LNG trade slowly increased with the emergence 
of Korea (1986) and then Taiwan (1990) as significant LNG importers towards the end of the 1980s, and the 
entry of Trinidad and Tobago and Qatar as LNG exporters in the late 1990s. While the scale of LNG flows 
was significant for the countries involved, the industry as a whole had a small number of players and was 
regarded as a high-cost, niche sector reserved primarily for countries with limited access to pipeline gas. 
Historically, then, LNG has been a point-to-point trade from “dedicated reserves to dedicated markets” so that 
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the ‘global’ LNG sector has consisted of regionally discrete and largely independent projects (Tusiani and 
Shearer 2006: 67).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 (Worldwide LNG Trade, 2002) and FIGURE 4 (Worldwide LNG Trade, 2015) HERE] 
 
Since 2000 the scale and significance of LNG has grown markedly, and we briefly outline here how LNG 
trade has increased in complexity and geographical scope (Figures 3 and 4). The volume of LNG trade has 
more than doubled - from around 100 MMTPA in 2002 to over 248 MMTPA in 2015 - growing at average of 
6 percent per annum between 2000 and 2014 (IGU 2016). Global growth in liquefaction capacity has been led 
by Qatar, which experienced an 80% increase between 2006 and 2011 (Flower 2011). Qatar now accounts for 
a third of all LNG exports, eclipsing the role of historic exporters (such as Algeria, Indonesia and Malaysia) in 
scale and reach through exports into both Atlantic and Pacific basins. However, Australia is expected to 
surpass Qatar as the world’s largest LNG exporter in 2018 following major capacity expansion (an additional 
65 million tons – equivalent to 25% of current trade - are planned to come on stream in the next few years) 
(Ledesma et al. 2014, Ripple 2014). A similar build-up of export capacity is occurring in the United States 
which became an LNG exporter in early 2016 (IGU 2016: 23).5 Other new exporters have also entered the 
LNG market since 2000 - Russia, Yemen, Angola, Peru, Norway, Equatorial Guinea, Papua New Guinea - 
raising the number of exporting countries to 17. At the same time, the number of LNG importing countries 
doubled to 30 (including new flows to Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, Chile) and the Middle East (Oman)). 
New regasification capacity has run ahead of liquefaction and now stands at around three-times the volume of 
annual trade. Figures 3 and 4 summarize the growing extent and intensity of LNG trade between 2002 and 
2015 which has eroded, although not replaced – the long-standing regional structure of LNG trade. Overall, 
LNG trade is anticipated to increase more rapidly than pipeline gas in the remainder of the decade, although 
the situation in the early 2020s is uncertain as the current low oil price and the changing nature of LNG trade 
itself are deferring investment in new gasification capacity (IEA 2015: 193). 
 
The expanding network of LNG infrastructure provides foundations for a more globally integrated market in 
natural gas to emerge, similar to that for oil. Growth in regasification capacity, for example, has enabled a 
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significant spot market to develop, along with a growing proportion of short-term (four years or less) 
agreements for the sale and purchase of gas: together these now represent 29% of global LNG trade (71.9 
mtpa) compared to less than 5% of the LNG market by volume in 2000 (IGU 2016). However, a series of 
shocks have disrupted a general trajectory of increasing gas market integration via LNG (Bradshaw et al. 
2015). Three shocks, in particular, have exacerbated the geographical unevenness of gas market globalization, 
and LNG flows and pricing terms continue to be strongly regionalized. At the same time, these shocks have 
also contributed to new patterns of LNG trading, the emergence of production networks that adopt non-
traditional organizational forms, and a diversification of contracts to include more flexible terms.  
 
The loss of the US as a potential LNG market constitutes the first shock. Much of the new LNG export 
capacity put in place in the early 2000s was underpinned by anticipated gas sales into the US. However, US 
shale gas production since 2008 has driven down natural gas prices in North America undermining the case 
for large-scale LNG imports. In the short term, the re-assertion of North America as a largely self-contained 
‘gas island’ resulted in a surplus of LNG in the Atlantic basin, with much of this gas finding its way into 
Europe (and Spain and the UK in particular), where it served to undermine the traditional long-term pricing 
system that had evolved around pipeline gas. In the longer-term, the availability of domestic shale gas has 
encouraged the development of LNG export projects in both the US and Canada (Boersma et al. 2015). As we 
explain below, the significance of these export projects goes beyond the volumes of gas involved, as the terms 
under which gas is sold from these projects effectively internationalizes the US domestic gas price (Henry 
Hub) as a global benchmark.  
 
The Tohuku earthquake and resulting tsunami in Japan in March 2011 constitutes a second shock, as it 
overwhelmed the Fukushima-Daichi nuclear power plant and led to the shut-down of Japan’s nuclear 
electricity generating capacity. The effect was to substantially increase the demand for gas in power 
generation, driving up the price for gas in the Japanese market and compounding a regional price divergence 
begun with the decline of the US gas price as a result of the ‘shale gale’. At its peak, the spot price in Japan 
was around $19 per million BTU, approximately double the price in European markets and over four times 
that in the US. The effect was to re-assert the dominance of Japan in LNG markets, draw spot cargoes towards 
17 
 
Asian markets, and drive LNG importers in Japan (and elsewhere in Asia) to seek alternative and more 
sustainable pricing structures. A third shock has been the fall in the price of oil since mid-2014. The drop in 
oil price has consequences for LNG for two reasons: most LNG projects are undertaken by oil and gas firms 
which have slashed expenditure on new project development; and most gas sold into Asian markets (and 
around 40% of gas sales in European markets) is indexed to the price of oil (rather than being based on gas-
on-gas competition). Traditionally LNG projects have utilized oil-indexed pricing as a way to cover the 
relatively high costs of building liquefaction facilities. From a developer’s perspective, the fall in the price of 
oil since 2014 “undermine(s) the rationale for relying on this pricing basis as the ‘gold standard’ for 
underpinning the economics of high cost-base LNG projects” (Rogers 2015: 47). Ironically, the previous 
period of high oil prices had led LNG importers—particularly in Japan—to question the logic of oil 
indexation and to explore alternative benchmarks for pricing gas, such as the US Henry-Hub. 
 
LNG production networks: erosion of the traditional ‘floating pipeline’ model 
Increases in LNG production and slowing demand growth have resulted in a period of significant over-supply, 
creating opportunities for new actors and a diversification in the organizational and territorial forms of LNG’s 
production network. LNG’s traditional organizational model integrated core upstream phases of gas 
production, liquefaction and shipping within the structure of a single entity (Kay and Roberts 2012).  In early 
LNG projects (such as those of Pertamina in Indonesia or Sonatrach in Algeria) resource production, 
liquefaction and shipping were vertically-integrated within the structure of the national oil company. The 
production and export of LNG effectively extended the developmental state’s role in securing value from 
sovereign resources. In parallel, downstream stages of regasification, transmission and gas consumption were 
also often integrated within a single organizational structure: in Korea, for example, this has taken the form of 
a national monopoly buyer KOGAS (until recently the world’s largest LNG buyer); in Japan it has been 
municipal or regional gas and electric utility companies (such as Tokyo Electric Power Company, Chubu 
Electric Power Company, and Shizuoka Gas Co). 
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Since the capital costs of liquefaction are very high (and represent about 50% of total chain costs), and LNG 
plants have limited operational flexibility with regard to output volumes, commercial production of LNG is 
dependent on securing downstream markets able to absorb supply (Pöyry 2010).6  LNG production networks 
have therefore tended to assume a ‘project’ character: the capital-intensive liquefaction stage is developed in 
association with both upstream (extractive) infrastructure and downstream import terminals, and underwritten 
by the value of long-term contracts (25 years) committing buyers to take specified volumes of gas. Such long-
term contracts have been essential to securing project finance to cover the cost of building the LNG plant and 
associated infrastructure as “without a meaningful commitment of a buyer (or buyers) to purchase the 
requisite volumes of LNG at an acceptable price and for the intended project duration, there would be no 
project” (Kay and Roberts 2012: 20; see also Douglass 2012). LNG projects, then, have traditionally brought 
together two territorial entities – a national seller and a national or regional buyer – via long-term, ‘take-or-
pay’ sale and purchase agreements. In these projects, IOCs provide access to technology, often via a third 
party engineering company (such as the German company Linde in the case of the cryogenic elements of the 
LNG plant) and project management and gas marketing experience. In regards to pricing, the balance of 
power between buyers and sellers in the traditional model rested largely with LNG producers, with buyers 
willing to pay a premium to secure supplies. This model was a direct product of the dominance of Japanese 
buyers in the expansion of the LNG sector where there was no pipeline alternative. Contracts allocated 
volume risk to buyers and price risk to suppliers, acting as “linchpins” linking the different elements of the 
LNG chain (Farmer and Sullivan 2012: 29).7  
This organizational model has characterized LNG since its establishment in the 1960s. It has given the 
industry its distinctive structure of “a series of virtually self-contained projects made up of interlinking chains 
of large-scale facilities, requiring huge capital investments, bound together by long-term contracts, and subject 
to intensive oversight by host governments and international organizations at every stage of the process” 
(Tusiani and Shearer 2006: 4). The combination of integrated organizational structures, limited infrastructure, 
and contract terms binding a high proportion of production to particular buyers, meant LNG production 
networks functioned, in effect, as a ‘floating pipeline’ ferrying gas from a discrete source of supply to a 
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discrete market (Tusiani and Shearer 2006: 201): in other words, the potential spatial flexibility afforded by 
ocean-going gas trade was, in practice, highly constrained.  
 
Diversification of production network structures  
 
The traditional model (A in Figure 5) has been eroded over time and is on the cusp of significant change. In 
this section we identify three significant organizational trends (B, C and D in Figure 5) in the contemporary 
global LNG sector and consider their implications.  First, a process of vertical disintegration and 
specialization (B) has increased the number of actors in LNG production networks. In the critical area of 
shipping, for example, independent LNG shipping fleets – i.e. not owned, managed or operated by upstream 
gas producers (e.g. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Teekay, Golar, Dynagas, and Höegh) - increasingly supplement the 
large fleets constructed and financed as part of major LNG projects and managed by LNG producers (e.g. 
Qatar Gas, Shell, BP). Independent carriers conclude long-term shipping and service agreements (time charter 
contracts) with LNG producers for the transport of their gas. They facilitate the growing market for short-term 
and spot gas sales, and are central to the growing geographical flexibility of LNG trade.  
 
The process of specialization and vertical disintegration in LNG extends beyond shipping to liquefaction and 
regasification, with the emergence of business models in which these facilities are operated on either a 
‘merchant’ or ‘tolling’ basis (Miles 2013). In liquefaction, for example, merchant and tolling models separate 
the ownership of the liquefaction facility from the ownership of upstream gas supply: in the merchant model, 
the owner of the LNG plant purchases gas and sells the resulting LNG; in the tolling model, the owner of the 
LNG plant does not take ownership of the gas, but is paid a fee for the option to access physical processing 
capacity. The nascent US LNG export market is emerging around a tolling model with owners of gas paying a 
service fee for access to liquefaction capacity.8 Tolling models are emerging at the re-gasification end of the 
LNG production network, with regasification and storage capacity constructed by companies who are neither 
LNG producers nor downstream gas consumers and operated on a fee-for-service basis.9  The growth of 
infrastructure and the emergence of big price differentials in regional markets have also created conditions for 
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the entry of third parties. New network participants include banks (Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital, Société 
Générale and JP Morgan) and commodity trading houses (Vitol, Trafigura, and Gunvor) who, operating 
outside of long-term contracts, seek to capture value from the spatial flexibility that LNG affords, moving gas 
to markets with temporary shortages (ICIS 2010). Overall, the fragmentation described above has increased 
the number and diversity of actors in the LNG production network, enhancing its organizational and territorial  
flexibility relative to the traditional model. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE – Organizational Trends in the LNG Production Network]  
 
Second, the traditional ‘bi-national’ character of LNG projects has been eroded in a significant way by cross-
border investments along the production network. This reflects, in part, the liberalization of national policies 
governing energy investment enabling non-domestic companies to take an equity stake and assume 
operational control of key assets, such as liquefaction and regasification plants and the infrastructures of gas 
consumption (utilities, power generation). Transnational investments in the liquefaction phase of the LNG 
production network are dominated by joint-venture arrangements between national oil companies and the 
IOCs – notably Shell, BP, Total, Exxon Mobil, Chevron and ENI. A number of state oil and gas firms, such as 
Malaysia’s Petronas and PetroChina (both partners in proposed LNG export plants in British Columbia, for 
example), are also active as transnational investors in upstream LNG. The growing significance of cross-
border investment also reflects a process of backward and forward integration (C and D, respectively, in 
Figure 5) occurring along the LNG production network, as downstream firms invest in assets upstream (and 
vice-versa) in order to share risk and capture value. Examples include gas trading and marketing firms taking 
equity positions in new LNG plants (e.g. Japan-based Mitsubishi and Mitsui in Sakhalin Energy or similarly 
Mitsubishi’s participation as an upstream investor in LNG projects around the world); and participation by 
utilities (e.g. Tokyo Gas, Osaka Gas, Engie, Gas Natural Fenosa) in shipping and/or liquefaction stages via 
equity holdings, such as the stake of South Korea’s KOGAS in the Prelude (10%) and Gladstone (15%) LNG 
projects in Australia (Tusiani and Shearer 2006: 86). This pattern of transnational co-venturing in LNG 
projects is largely obscured by conventional ‘national’ analyses of upstream assets: for example, over 90% of 
LNG imports to the UK come from Qatar, but the LNG project from which the bulk of these imports are 
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sourced (Qatargas II) is a co-venture of Total, Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum. The process of forward 
integration involves owners of resource and liquefaction assets acquiring market access by taking equity 
positions in, or concluding capacity agreements with, owners of regasification terminals.10  
Third, the discrete, point-to-point character of current LNG trade is also being re-worked through a process of 
horizontal integration, as upstream and downstream companies take positions across multiple LNG projects. 
At the upstream end, IOCs like Shell and BP have well-established LNG trading arms (e.g. Shell Eastern 
Trading, BP Singapore) that source supply from the various projects in which they are partners. These 
arrangements are reflected in the emergence of an ‘aggregator’ business model in which suppliers use 
portfolio flexibility to source gas from anywhere, rather than from a single captive project. The BG Group 
(now part of Shell) adopted the aggregator model, building downstream market positions in the UK, US and 
Singapore and a portfolio of flexible LNG volumes that could be sourced from north Africa, west Africa and 
the Caribbean. By not being tied to a single project, the portfolio reduces supply risks for LNG buyers—
especially when contracting to new liquefaction projects that are frequently delayed, and enables suppliers to 
optimize across a suite of assets. The portfolio organizational form is the clearest expression of an alternative 
to the ‘floating pipeline’ model which has characterized the historical evolution of LNG.  
 
Changing network practices 
 
The volume, timing and destination of LNG flows are governed by the contracts concluded between buyers 
and sellers of LNG. Contracts are a critical “network development practice” in the sense implied by Murphy 
(2012: 211): i.e. they are “mutually coherent, recognizable, and legitimated practices (through which) 
business people develop relational proximity with each other.” It is through contracts that the relational 
proximity that defines the LNG production network is achieved, with power relations between buyers and 
sellers shaping contract terms. The diversification of organizational forms and the growing complexity of 
LNG production networks described above are changing long-established contract practices with significant 
implications for the geographies of LNG trade. In general terms, these changes reflect a shift in market power 
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within LNG production networks towards buyers, associated with growing depth and liquidity of LNG 
markets: however, as we illustrate below, this is geographically very uneven. Contract terms are becoming 
more variegated over time as new practices around destination flexibility, volume flexibility, and price emerge 
(Table 1). Taken together these non-traditional network development practices are causing LNG production 
networks to function less like floating pipelines, contributing to a more geographically integrated and liquid 
market. We focus here on two: destination flexibility and pricing.  
 
TABLE 1 
Changing network practices: comparison of traditional and emergent contract characteristics 
 Source: based on Tusiani and Shearer (2006) with other sources 
Traditional contract characteristics Emergent contract characteristics  
Long-term, take-or-pay obligations Shorter-term, options on delivery 
Limited off-take flexibility Flexibility in off-take volumes 
No destination flexibility Flexibility in delivery points 
Oil-indexation of prices (outside US) Pressure on oil-indexation, hub-benchmarking? 
Limited options for review/re-opening Contract re-opening   
 
Destination flexibility 
 
A growing number of LNG contracts allow for flexibility in cargo destination. In the historical model buyers 
were prohibited, by the terms of the contract, from landing a cargo at any other import terminal than that 
named in the contract (i.e. the buyer’s facilities). This primarily reflected the interests of sellers who, whether 
for pricing, marketing or financial reasons (e.g. export credit agency support for LNG plant construction was 
conditional on a proportion of cargoes being landed in a domestic market) wanted to restrict the ability of 
buyers to sell the cargo into a different market (Ashurst 2009). However, buyers are increasingly negotiating 
into contracts the right to divert cargoes, enabling them to trade LNG more widely This process is more 
advanced in the Atlantic market, particularly in relation to contracts concluded for LNG export from the US, 
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but is also growing in significance in the Pacific basin. It is also associated with a greater use of ‘free on 
board’ (FOB) terms in sale and purchase agreements, which give the buyer responsibility for delivery and 
destination. The traditional model, which still dominates sales into Asian and most European markets, 
specified delivery ‘ex-ship’ (DES) and made the seller responsible for delivery (typically to a specified point). 
While it is possible to write destination flexibility into DES contracts, the buyer is still beholden to the seller 
for delivery and so diversion requires their agreement. The growing use of FOB terms places destination 
within the buyer’s control, affording flexibility in where the cargo is traded and enabling buyers to seek out 
arbitrage opportunities (Kay and Roberts: 2012). National and international policy commitments to liberalize 
energy markets have also taken aim at destination clauses: the G7 has committed to “promote flexible gas 
markets” via relaxation of destination clauses and under EU competition law Sale and Purchase Agreements 
involving the EU cannot contain destination restrictions (Platts 2014, Farmer and Sullivan 2012, Weem nd). 
The effect of growing destination flexibility in the contract terms which structure LNG production networks is 
that a growing proportion of LNG is tradeable as it is no longer bound to a particular destination. 
 
Pricing innovation 
 
The territorially embedded character of LNG markets – derivative of regional energy histories and the 
availability of alternative sources (such as pipeline gas) - has given rise to regionally distinctive pricing 
regimes. The LNG sold into Asia, and in continental Europe (apart from the Netherlands and Belgium) has 
traditionally been priced against crude oil. In the US and the UK, however, gas prices are disclosed through 
the market and reflect an energy infrastructure enabling gas-on-gas competition: LNG pricing in the US 
references the physical gas trading point of Henry Hub in Louisiana; while in the UK, prices reference the 
National Balancing Point (NBP), a virtual location in the national transmission system. These different pricing 
regimes mean that two broad patterns of LNG production networks have emerged, differentiated by the 
markets into which LNG is sold: one linked to oil-indexation and representing the bulk of LNG trade and a 
cornerstone of the ‘traditional model’ described above; the other—an ‘emergent model’—linked to hub-
pricing in relatively liquid markets. In the latter case, the LNG importer has to accept the prevailing domestic 
market price and the UK, for example, tends to be the market of last resort. 
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Since 2008 prices between the Henry Hub and Asia (JCC) have sharply diverged, driven initially by growing 
domestic US production of shale gas (Bradshaw et al. 2015) and compounded by the shutdown of nuclear 
power fleet in Japan and South Korea (which created an additional demand for gas).  The scale and 
persistence of this price difference (which was as much as $15 per mmbtu) has encouraged innovation in LNG 
pricing. On the one hand, it spurred gas importers in Asia to review prevailing pricing structures, develop 
alliances that increase their market power, and seek greater transparency around price in the Asian markets 
(e.g. the Japan OTC Exchange, and Platts Japan-Korea Marker Price). In 2015, for example, Chubu Electric 
and Tokyo Electric Power Company, two of the largest buyers in Japan, created a downstream LNG 
purchasing alliance with a combined annual volume of around 35-40 mmtpa. On the other hand, buyers like 
Chubu Electric sought to offload the volume risk associated with the traditional model, pursuing greater 
destination-flexibility, negotiating FOB contract terms and by entering into joint procurement with overseas 
buyers. More generally, the growing depth of the LNG market has encouraged buyers to seek mid-to short 
term contracts once long-term contracts come up for renewal, and to turn for an increasing proportion of their 
demand to the spot market. Most recently, and most significantly, the Japanese Government has used its 
Presidency of G7 to put forward a strategy to promote the development of a flexible and liquid LNG market 
establish an LNG trading hub in Asia (METI 2016). Unsurprisingly, traditional suppliers have sought to 
defend oil-indexation and there is now the potential for significant commercial conflict over pricing between 
producers and purchasers in Asian markets (Stern 2016), exacerbating the uncertainty facing those seeking to 
invest in new liquefaction capacity in the early 2020s. 
 
Innovations in pricing are significant because they exemplify a process of experimentation currently 
underway in LNG production networks as suppliers and buyers seek to re-allocate risk. They also are also a 
product of a shift in the power balance in favor of LNG purchasers.  Experimentation, in the form of emergent 
network practices – such as destination flexibility and pricing discussed here –is eroding the regionalized-
character of LNG production networks. The appearance of Henry Hub pricing in LNG contracts for sale in 
Japan (which has been dominated by oil-indexation) indicates how LNG is re-spatializing gas markets: the 
reference to Henry Hub carries material and infrastructural conditions that are characteristic of one highly 
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regionalized market (the US) into another (Japan). Although this trend has been slowed by the impact of 
falling oil prices, it shows how production networks and network development practices, rather than simply 
physical commodity trade, are driving gas market integration.  
 
Conclusion   
A global gas market is emerging enabled by major investments in the infrastructures for producing, shipping 
and consuming liquefied natural gas. Although claims for a global gas market are premature, the LNG sector 
is at a pivotal moment in its evolution. Most analyses of this sector - and of international energy markets more 
generally - focus on international trade flows in energy commodities rather than on the cross-border 
production networks through which this trade is organized. In this paper we have adopted a GPN approach 
focused on the actors and relational practices that influence where, when and how gas moves beyond the 
limits of continental pipelines. This approach has enabled us to show how a dominant ‘traditional’ model is 
being rapidly re-worked in the context of growing LNG supply, identifying a process of organizational and 
territorial experimentation as buyers, suppliers and other actors have sought new ways to reallocate risk and 
capture value. While an LNG production network has been around for over 50 years, we have shown how it is 
only recently that organizational structures and network development practices have emerged that depart from 
the ‘floating pipeline’ model and enable LNG’s potential geographical flexibility to be realized.   
To account for the processes shaping the globalization of gas markets our analysis has mobilized three 
conceptual elements: territoriality, materiality and network practices. The LNG production network is an 
exemplar par excellence of how the materiality of commodities is integral (rather than incidental) to the 
geographies of their circulation, presenting barriers to and opportunities for the re-scaling of markets. We 
have approached LNG as a particular techno-material configuration of natural gas that enables it to be moved 
and sold beyond the traditional limits of pipeline. Material transformation (from gas to liquid, from liquid to 
gas) and material stabilization (e.g. maintaining gas as a liquid for transport and storage) create opportunities 
for value capture, while the technical challenges and large capital costs involved restrict these opportunities to 
particular actors. A techno-material perspective, focused on how the material properties of natural gas enable 
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and constrain the pursuit of value, therefore sheds light on the expansion of international markets for natural 
gas and the organization of LNG production networks. In its own, however, it is unable to account for 
significant recent changes in the organization and territorial configuration of the LNG production network. A 
key material aspect of LNG (the creation of discrete, ocean-borne cargoes) has always given it a much higher 
degree of potential spatial flexibility than pipeline gas, but in practice this potential has been highly 
constrained and the LNG production network has operated as a set of largely separate ‘floating pipelines’. The 
concept of territoriality provides a way to understand how and why LNG’s long-established territorial form is 
now changing. In turning to territoriality we have endeavored to retain something of the processual and 
explanatory (rather than spatially descriptive) meaning associated with its early application to geographical 
political economy. As a top-level concept, the value of territoriality is that it simultaneously leans forward to 
highlight a significant ‘global shift’ underway in the geographies of the LNG production network, and 
backward to the strategies and practices of network actors through which these spatial configurations are 
made. Our account of territoriality in the LNG production network is empirically grounded in the multiple 
activities of buyers, sellers and other actors. The concept of network development practices provides a finer-
grained analytical tool for sorting through these detailed activities, identifying key practices which hold the 
production network together and which have a key influence on its emergent territorial form.  
 
The paper has provided the first systematic analysis within economic geography of the globalization of the 
LNG sector and its influence on global gas markets. It makes two significant contributions. First, adopting a 
GPN approach and foregrounding the question of territoriality discloses significant changes in organizational 
structures and network territorial forms that a focus on energy technologies, resources or patterns of gas trade 
is unable to reveal.  The new organizational structures and network practices emerging in the LNG production 
network are integral to the ways in which gas is becoming globalized, and they have significant geo-economic 
and geopolitical implications. Contract flexibility and the growth of tradeable LNG create new uncertainties 
that are strategically significant for gas exporters and importers, and for future investment in network 
infrastructure. Increased flexibility around contracts and pricing may promote an increasingly globalized 
market, but it is unclear whether the associated lack of surety (in terms of future income streams) can finance 
the next generation of LNG projects: accordingly, there is potential for supply shortages in the 2020s if 
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demand growth picks up as expected. Moreover, the erosion of the traditional model is geographically uneven. 
Importers in Japan and South Korea have evolved ‘dedicated’ supply structures for which they pay a 
premium, whereas in Europe - and increasingly in China - LNG competes against domestic sources and 
pipeline gas. There is a growing commitment in Europe to marshal the flexibility of LNG to counter 
dependence on Russian pipeline gas imports, but LNG flows into Europe wax and wane depending on the 
relative price of alternative gas sources, providing limited supply security. From an LNG importing country 
policy perspective, there is a balance to be struck between achieving physical gas security through network 
practices that ‘lock in’ dedicated supply (the Asian model), compared to a market-based form of security 
where the critical determinant is the price necessary to secure LNG imports (as in the UK). In sum, our 
analysis of the LNG production network demonstrates the potential of GPN for contributing new insights into 
the emergence, organization and scaling of contemporary energy markets, and their economic and political 
implications.    
 
Second, we have shown how an emergent territorial form (a ‘global’ gas market) is enabled and shaped by the 
actors and relations internal to a production network. Our analysis identifies how actors in the LNG sector, 
and the organizational structures and network practices through which they are functionally integrated, have a 
central role in the emergence of a global market for gas. The practices of buyers and sellers in the LNG 
production network - to align interests, allocate risk and capture value - make the market and shape its 
emergent territorial form (cf. Hamilton 2011). Their combined effects are changing the way gas is bought and 
sold and, at the same time, creating new geographies of gas that encompass international trade, cross-border 
investment, and price formation. A global gas market, in short, is neither self-organizing nor an ineluctable 
force but an emergent property of the LNG production network. The paper has responded to calls for more 
‘process-sensitive’ accounts of global production networks by focusing on the relationship between 
organizational structures, network practices and territorial form. In doing so, we hope to have realized more 
fully GPN’s potential as an analysis of network territoriality by recognizing how network territoriality is 
constitutive of markets rather than merely responsive to them.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                        
 
1
 The ‘difficulty’ of natural gas (a mixture of different gases which contains impurities, is highly flammable 
and readily dissipates) is a staple feature of industrial accounts of the sector’s evolution. Kaup’s analysis 
(2008: 1736) on the Bolivian gas sector notes that because natural gas requires modes of extraction, 
separation, transport and technological innovation that are capital intensive (and, accordingly, large scale), 
there are only limited opportunities for local firms and/or the domestic state to control technological 
innovations that enhance value capture (such as investment in gas-to-liquids technology to address local 
deficits in liquid fuels such as diesel).  
 
2 A recent analysis of global LNG markets by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies talks of ‘the great 
reconfiguration’ (Corbeau and Ledesma 2016).   
 
3
 Although we focus here on the growth of the international seaborne LNG trade, small-scale liquefaction is 
also increasingly associated with an inland truck-based retail trade in some gas markets where distribution 
pipelines are weakly developed (e.g. in China). This LNG retail trade – supplying industrial users who are 
‘off-grid’ and the trucking industry – is frequently promoted by the LNG industry as a potential growth 
market. The French-based multinational ENGIE (formerly GDF-Suez), for example, estimates it could 
account for about 20% of the overall LNG market in 2030. 
 
4
 The funded research consisted of three linked elements, and focussed on (i) the implications of the boom in 
US shale gas production; (ii) European pipeline networks; and (iii) LNG. The project team included specialist 
partners in the Gas Programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (https://www.oxfordenergy.org). 
  
5
 The ‘entry’ of the US into the ranks of LNG exporters (as it is popularly described) in January 2016, with the 
first shipments from Cherniere’s Sabine Pass terminal on the Gulf Coast, refers only to the lower-48 states as 
the US has exported LNG from Alaska to Japan since 1969 via the Kenai LNG plant on the Cook Inlet. As of 
January 2016, 62 million tons of new capacity is planned in the US.  
 
 
6
 Capital costs have risen sharply in the last decade: in 2013 they stood at around $1200 per tonne LNG per 
year, implying a large liquefaction train (around 8 MMTPA) may cost in the range of $8-9 billion (Songhurst 
2014); Pöyry (2010) indicate capital expenditure for an 8MMTPA liquefaction plant at $6-10 billion, with this 
component significantly larger than shipping ($1-2.5 billion) or regasification ($1-1.5 billion).   
 
7
 In the dominant Asian market, for example, contracts price LNG against the so-called Japanese Crude 
Cocktail (or more properly the Japanese Custom Cleared Crude Oil Price, a weighted average price for crude 
imports to Japan) and the inclusion of a pricing cap – the so-called ‘s-curve’ – protects buyers and sellers 
against large price swings (Farmer and Sullivan 2012). 
 
8
 This model is being adopted, for example, at Cheniere Energy’s terminal at Sabine Pass in Louisiana and is 
also the framework for a number of the country’s other proposed export plants (Persilly 2013). The tolling 
model for liquefaction is enabled by the liquidity of the US gas market and the density of gas supply 
infrastructure. It also reflects the way proposed US LNG export facilities are essentially a strategic response to 
changed market conditions not by upstream resource holders, but by companies owning land and facilities 
originally intended as LNG import terminals, and which have access to venture capital seeking relatively 
short-term returns. 
 
9
 The Grain import terminal in the UK, for example, is run by the national transmission system operator 
(National Grid) on a commercial tolling basis: National Grid neither imports LNG into Grain nor sells gas 
from it on its own account, but sells capacity rights to a range of upstream LNG producers and downstream 
utilities.  A similar model is associated with the rapid growth of floating storage and regasification units 
(FSRU). Moored offshore, these units allow municipal, regional or national gas networks to expand and 
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diversify gas imports by tapping into global LNG. Specialist companies (e.g. Höegh LNG; Excelerate Energy) 
build and operate the FSRU, and market regasification capacity to those owning LNG or seeking to import 
gas. 
 
10
 A similar process of overseas downstream investment to secure market access characterized LNG import 
terminal construction in the US in the 1990s and early 2000s.  Prior to the growth of domestic shale gas 
production: Qatar Petroleum, Exxon Mobil and Conoco Phillips, for example, constructed Golden Pass, one of 
the world’s largest LNG import terminals, at Sabine Pass, Texas (Golden Pass has subsequently sought to 
redevelop the facilities as an LNG export terminal on a merchant model (Miles 2013)). 
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